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Introduction
Those who seek to understand the Chief Justice's role in the federal
judicial system of the United States will find little enlightenment in the
Constitution. The words "Chief Justice" appear only once in the Constitu-
tion's text-not in Article III, which delineates judicial powers, but in Arti-
cle I, which governs legislative powers-in the clause that assigns the role
of presiding authority over presidential impeachments.' Aside from this
singular duty, the Constitution "envelops the office of Chief Justice with
silence."2
As a result, the office of Chief Justice has developed over time in a
manner not unlike the common law itself, drawing on inherited institu-
tional traditions, but adapting to changing needs through the incremental
accretion of precedent. Currently, the Chief Justice's duties include such
various activities as presiding over hearings and conferences of the
Supreme Court; leading the Judicial Conference of the United States;3
t Senior Judge and former Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The views expressed in this article are the Author's alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of the court as a whole. The Author wishes to express his
gratitude to participants in the Conference of Chief Judges of Asia and the Pacific, who
participated in the survey upon which this article is based. He also expresses his
sincere appreciation to Yvette Golan, Esq., and Evan Criddle, Esq., for their effective
assistance with this article.
1. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, d. 6 ("When the President of the United States is tried
[for impeachment], the Chief Justice shall preside ....")
2. Peter G. Fish, The Office of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal Judici-
ary's Bicentennial Decade, in THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE 1, 9 (The White Burkett Miller
Ctr. of Public Affairs, Univ. of Va. 1984).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
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reporting new procedural, evidentiary, and bankruptcy rules to Congress; 4
approving both rules made by the Supreme Court librarian 5 and final deci-
sions concerning the architectural design of the Thurgood Marshall Fed-
eral Judiciary Building;6 maintaining a roster of retired federal judges "who
are willing and able to undertake special judicial duties ... outside their
own circuit";7 appointing judges to the National Historical Publications
Commission;8 assigning Article III judges to serve as temporary district
court judges in the Territory of Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("Northern Mariana
Islands"); 9 and serving as a Member and Regent of the Smithsonian Institu-
tion and as a Trustee of the National Gallery of Art and the Joseph H.
Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden. 10 Because few of these respon-
sibilities are written in stone (and only one in the Constitution), the office
continues to evolve in relative obscurity under a variety of pressures, not
the least of which are the idiosyncratic visions of and revisions by individ-
ual Chief Justices."
Interestingly, the United States' experience is not unique in this
respect; most foreign constitutions and codes contain similarly vacuous
references to their highest judicial officer. For example, the constitutions
of Australia and the People's Republic of China ("China") each provide for
a Chief Justice to preside over its court of last resort, but neither document
details the Chief Justice's specific role and responsibilities. 12 Subject to
modest statutory restrictions, most Chief Justices exercise considerable
discretion in apportioning their time among adjudication, administration,
and other functions. Internationally, the office of Chief Justice remains
very much a "work-in-progress," just as it is in the United States.
The downside to this evolutionary process is that Chief Justices ordi-
narily have access to only one model for the office-the example of their
immediate predecessors. Not all models for the office of Chief Justice are
created equal. In some countries, inherited traditions may perpetuate
failed programs or antiquated procedures. Even workable models can limit
progress if Chief Justices fail to entertain new ideas and consider success-
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074-2075 (2000).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 674(b) (2000); Sup. CT. R. 2.
6. 40 U.S.C.A § 6502(d) (West Supp. 2004).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2000).
8. 44 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1)(E) (2000).
9. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424b(a), 1614(a), 1821(b)(2) (2002).
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 41, 42, 72, 76cc(b) (2000). For a complete list of the ChiefJustice's
statutory duties as of 1979, see Fish, supra note 2, at 229-32.
11. As Professor Alpheus T. Mason has observed:
No one function, nor all combined, suffice to explain the office and power of the
Chief Justice. Besides the functions themselves, the incumbent's influence
depends on the use he makes of them and the manner in which they are dis-
charged. Beyond all this is the human factor, the intangibles, the personality-
the moral energy the man at the center releases.
Fish, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United
States: Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. PuB. L. 20, 60 (1968)).
12. AusTL. CONST. ch. Ill, art. 71 (1986); P.R.C. CONST. ch. II, § I, arts. 62(7), 63(4),
67(11); § VII, art. 124 (1982).
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ful practices implemented in other countries, which might allow them to
improve on their predecessors' examples.
Until relatively recently, national Chief Justices could rarely compare
notes on their respective activities. Advances in transportation and com-
munication technologies now permit Chief Justices to meet face-to-face and
maintain regular contact-creating unprecedented opportunities for global
cooperation and collaboration. I have witnessed this trend firsthand as a
member of the Judicial Conference of the United States International Judi-
cial Relations Committee and as an enthusiastic advocate and participant
in the globalization of judicial education. 13 For more than two decades, I
have labored with judicial leaders and educators worldwide to develop fora
where Chief Justices can gather to receive training and share ideas. Such
international and regional conferences provide invaluable opportunities for
Chief Justices to obtain information on global developments in judicial
administration and to be exposed to alternative solutions to problems, thus
helping them to broaden their views beyond parochial judicial traditions.
One of the major challenges judicial educators face in designing pro-
grams for Chief Justices is the paucity of scholarly research on the duties
and activities of Chief Justices in various countries. To date, no significant
comparative study has been conducted on the scope of Chief Justices'
authority or of their nonadjudicatory functions. In June 2003, I attempted
to address this lacuna by conducting an informal survey at the Conference
of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific. Collectively, the Chief Justices at
this Conference have jurisdiction over two-thirds of the world's population.
The survey questions explore a range of issues, including the Chief Jus-
tices' prior judicial experience; the composition of the Chief Justices'
courts; the Chief Justices' oversight authority vis-A-vis associate justices
and lower courts; and the Chief Justices' role in judicial training, discipline,
judicial administration, communications with the media, and relations
with the executive, legislature, and bar. Although by no means exhaustive,
the responses of the Chief Justices cast light on the professional activities of
Chief Justices throughout Asia and the Pacific and provide a variety of valu-
able insights to aid the education of future Chief Justices.
This Article begins in Part I by distinguishing and contextualizing
three key movements in global judicial education: information transmis-
sion, training, and peer exchange. Part 11 presents a general overview of
the survey data, highlighting a variety of commonalities and divergences in
the Chief Justices' responses. In Part III, I consider the data's significance
for the globalization of Chief Justice education and argue that Chief Jus-
tices are likely to benefit more from global education programs that employ
a peer-exchange method rather than from a "training" approach.
13. See The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Globalization of Judicial Education, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 355, 360-61 (2003) (contending that judicial education programs
should globalize to meet the demands of the increasingly international legal
community).
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1. Judicial Globalization and the Office of Chief Justice
The last several years have witnessed a swelling of scholarly attention
toward "judicial globalization"-the "diverse and messy process of judicial
interaction across, above, and below borders, exchanging ideas and cooper-
ating in cases involving national as much as international law." 14 As Pro-
fessor Anne-Marie Slaughter observed, .transjurisdictional interactions take
place in a variety of contexts and on a variety of levels, "involving both
'vertical' relations between national and international tribunals and 'hori-
zontal' relations across national borders.' 15 Although commentators typi-
cally characterize judicial globalization as a reaction to exogenous forces
such as the globalization of transactions, the worldwide emphasis on
human rights norms since World War II, and the tendency toward interna-
tional convergence of certain areas of the law,1 6 this is only half of the
story. As Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has stressed, judi-
cial globalization also represents a fundamental shift in judges' percep-
tions of their own role: "Globalization... represents a greater awareness of,
and access to, peoples and places far different from our own. The fates of
nations are more closely intertwined than ever before and we are more
acutely aware of the connections we have with others."
17
The area of judicial globalization that has probably received the most
attention is the cross-fertilization of constitutional norms. Transjudicial-
ism is not a new phenomenon. Where appropriate, some courts in the
United States have sought ideas and new approaches from the decisions of
foreign courts, just as foreign courts have borrowed heavily from American
jurisprudence. 18 The frequency and intensity of this international dia-
logue, however, has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years, as
courts around the world grapple with issues arising out of a globalizing
market for resources, ideas, and information. Debates over divisive social
issues increasingly play out on the international stage and are framed for
14. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104
(2000).
15. Id.
16. Prof. Dr. Carl Baudenbacher, judicial Globalization: New Development or Old
Wine in New Bottles?, 38 TEX. INT'L LJ. 505, 506 (2003); Wallace, supra note 13, at 360
17. The Honorable J. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, in 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 348, 349 (2002).
18. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN
AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1 (1978) ("From ancient times ... those wishing to
establish a just legal system have sought inspiration and example from other lands.");
The Honorable Claire L'Heureux-Dub , The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA LJ. 15, 19 (1998) ("In elaborating
the rights and freedoms in the [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme
Court of Canada] frequently has turned to American jurisprudence on the Bill of
Rights."); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 537, 541 (1988) ("When life or liberty is at stake, the landmark judgments of the
Supreme Court of the United States ... are studied with as much attention in New Delhi
or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C., or the State of Washington... "); Slaugh-
ter, supra note 14, at 1116 ("Legal cross-fertilization generally is ... not new, particu-
larly among imperial powers and their colonies. ... Plenty of evidence can be... found
in 19th century U.S. and federal reports.") (internal footnote omitted).
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decision before judges in different jurisdictions at the same time. 19 As
evinced by the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas,20 courts in
the United States are showing an interest in considering the jurisprudence
of other national and international courts as persuasive authority for
resolving issues of global interest. 2 1
Less heralded than international substantive law are the increasing
face-to-face discussions between justices and judges at international and
regional gatherings. Significantly, Chief Justices now participate in an
array of international and regional associations such as the Conference of
Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific, the Organization of Supreme Courts
of the Americas ("O.S.C.A."), the Conference of Chief Justices of Africa, the
South Pacific Judicial Conference, the Pacific Judicial Council, the Interna-
tional Common Law Conference, the Commonwealth Law Conference, the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Law ("SAARCLAW"),
the Asian Law Conference, and the International Judicial Conference.
Nongovernmental organizations such as the Law Association for Asia and
the Pacific ("LAWASIA") and the American Bar Association's Central and
Eastern European Law Initiative ("C.E.E.L.I.") arrange meetings among
judges from different countries to facilitate law reform and judicial -train-
ing.22 Educational institutions such as Yale Law School and New York Uni-
versity Law School have hosted conferences to facilitate discussion among
justices from national and international tribunals. 23 As the forces of
globalization give rise to unprecedented political, economic, and cultural
interchange, so too have they made possible a dramatic increase in the face-
to-face contacts of judges from various parts of the world.
I stated earlier that conferences of judicial leaders are less heralded
than the sister aspect of judicial globalization dealing with comparative
substantive law. This is not surprising. Comparative substantive law has
always been the headline and comparative judicial administration a mere
footnote. Comparative approaches to judicial administration have gained
an increasing number of adherents, however, as it has become clear that
how a judiciary functions is just as important as the legal doctrines it artic-
ulates. After all, no legal right is enforceable without a functioning court to
enforce it. Thus, making the court system effective, the task of judicial
administration should stand on equal footing with the law it produces.
Since Chief Justices play a pivotal leadership role in judicial administra-
tion, regional and international conferences of Chief Justices are an indis-
pensable opportunity to make judicial systems more effective.
19. L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 18, at 23.
20. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. Id. at 577 ("The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is
somehow more legitimate or urgent."); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Commu-
nity of Courts, 44 HlAv. INT'L LJ. 191, 199-202 (2003) (discussing the use of foreign
precedents as "persuasive authority").
22. Slaughter, supra note 21, at 216 n.130.
23. Id.
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So far, the international community has embraced the flowering of
judicial education with a generous outpouring of resources and enthusi-
asm. But because international conferences of leaders are a relatively new
development, organizers still struggle to devise curricula and activities that
maximize the judges' limited time and resources. This difficulty is particu-
larly acute for international and regional conferences of Chief Justices. It is
axiomatic that conference organizers are most successful when they tailor
their methodology to an individual student's needs, and this principle
applies equally well to judicial education. Yet the scope of Chief Justices'
authority and activities outside the courtroom remain relatively obscure
everywhere, creating significant roadblocks to the development of effective
international conferences and education programs.
To ensure that future international and regional programs for Chief
Justices will be productive, we need to answer two questions. First, what
functions do Chief Justices perform? Second, how can conference
organizers and judicial educators best assist Chief Justices in performing
these functions?
II. Surveying the Office of Chief Justice
At the 2001 Conference of the Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific,
the assembled Chief Justices expressed an interest in exchanging informa-
tion on how each carries out his or her responsibilities. To facilitate this
proposal, I distributed an informal survey in April 2003.24 1 have since
received completed questionnaires from the Chief Justices of twenty-seven
countries: Australia, the People's Republic of Bangladesh ("Bangladesh"),
the Union of Myanmar ("Myanmar"), the Kingdom of Cambodia ("Cambo-
dia"), China, the Republic of the Fiji Islands ("Fiji"), the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region ("Hong Kong"), the Republic of India ("India"), the
Republic of Indonesia ("Indonesia"), Japan, the Republic of Kiribati
("Kiribati"), the Macau Special Administrative Region ("Macau"), the
Republic of the Marshall Islands ("Marshall Islands"), the Federated States
of Micronesia, Mongolia, the Republic of Nauru ("Nauru"), the Kingdom of
Nepal ("Nepal"), New Zealand, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic
of the Philippines ("Philippines"), the Independent State of Samoa
("Samoa"), the Republic of Seychelles ("Seychelles"), the Republic of Singa-
pore ("Singapore"), the Solomon Islands, the Republic of Korea ("South
Korea"), the Kingdom of Thailand ("Thailand"), and the Kingdom of Tonga
("Tonga"). 25 The Chief Justices' responses are provided in abbreviated
form in Appendices 3 through 8.26
Professional pollsters will undoubtedly detect flaws in the survey, and
I accept full responsibility for any imperfections in its methodology or
24. The survey questions are listed in Appendix 1.
25. The Chief Justices of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan, the Russian Federation, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam also submitted
incomplete questionnaires, which I have omitted from this study.
26. The Appendices also incorporate responses from a brief follow-up survey, which
was requested by several Chief Justices and distributed in January 2004.
Vol. 38
2005 Comparative Perspectives on the Office of Chief Justice 225
presentation. The survey's scope and purpose are limited. First, it consid-
ers a set of geographically linked countries in Asia and the Pacific, which is
not necessarily a representative sample of the world's judicial systems as a
whole (despite the fact that they contain two-thirds of the world's popula-
tion and include both common law and civil law systems). Second, the
survey does not purport to canvass the entire field of the Chief Justices'
professional activities. Nevertheless, incomplete and provisional though it
may be, the survey is the first and only of its kind, and its results should be
of great interest to Chief Justices, comparativist scholars, and others
engaged in the perplexities of judicial globalization.
A. Chief Justices and Their Courts
All twenty-seven of the countries surveyed select their Chief Justice by
appointment pursuant to a constitutional or statutory mandate. 2 7 The vast
majority entrust this decision directly to the chief executive, the legislature,
a special committee, or some combination of the three. Notable exceptions
are India and Thailand, which employ a seniority system, and Mongolia,
which invites its eleven justices to select their own leader. 28
Relatively few of the Chief Justices polled had substantial experience
on the highest court before their appointments. Only seven had served as
associate justices for more than two years, and over half had no prior expe-
rience on the highest court at all.29 Equally rare were formal training pro-
grams for Chief Justices; none of the respondents were trained prior to
appointment, and only a handful had received formal on-the-job training.
Most of the Chief Justices believe that more training for the office of Chief
Justice would be helpful, particularly in areas outside the scope of tradi-
tional judge and lawyer practice such as appellate case management, judi-
cial administration, and budgetary planning.
Aside from China and Thailand, which have, respectively, 330 and 85
judges on their supreme courts, most highest courts in the survey sample
are of modest size, ranging from one (the Marshall Islands and Nauru) to
twenty-six justices (India).30 Fifteen of the twenty-seven countries sur-
veyed have ten or fewer justices on their highest courts. 3 1 Nearly all of the
Chief Justices indicated that they have an interest in, and a continuing obli-
gation to, the welfare and development of their judicial colleagues. 32
27. See infra Appendix 3.
28. In the United States, Chief Justices of state and territorial supreme courts are
selected in one of four ways: direct appointment or election to the office of Chief justice,
election by members of the Supreme Court, longevity, or rotation. See James Duke Cam-
eron et al., The Chief Justice and the Court Administrator: The Evolving Relationship, 113
F.R.D. 439, 447-48 (1987).
29. See infra Appendix 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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B. Oversight Authority
As the presiding authority and "manager" of the highest courts, Chief
Justices bear a special burden to ensure the efficient and professional
administration of justice. Chief Justices preside over their courts in public
proceedings as well as in closed conferences and, in addition, play a signifi-
cant role in the court's deliberations. In all but eight of the twenty-seven
countries polled, the Chief Justices also determine the distribution of cases
among their associates on the court.3 3 Roughly half of the Chief Justices
are assigned the same number of cases as their colleagues. 3 4
Although Chief Justices generally take an active interest in the timely
disposition of cases, their authority to influence the expeditious decision
of particular cases varies from country to country. Most Chief Justices
encourage their associates through private dialogue or informal discussion
during court meetings, but a few wield a bigger stick. In China, for exam-
ple, justices on the Supreme People's Court labor under a statutory time
limit supervised by the Chief Justice.35 For Thailand's cadre of 85 justices,
delinquency in completing assigned dispositions can lead to disciplinary
action at the Chief Justice's behest. The Marshall Islands' lone justice-a
part-time position-also faces coercive pressures to deliver prompt deci-
sions; failure to satisfy a forty-five-day statutory deadline results in a with-
holding of pay for the case until the case is decided.36
The Chief Justices handle their disputes with associate justices over
non-case-related issues in different ways. In Myanmar, China, Hong Kong,
India, Kiribati, and Singapore, the Chief Justice has virtually plenary
authority to decide all non-case-related disputes.3 7 Other countries refer
such matters to an independent council or mediator. The vast majority,
however, lack formal procedures for resolving such disputes between jus-
tices and rely on the justices themselves to resolve their disagreements ami-
cably through private discussion or, when necessary, collective
deliberation.
Aside from their appellate function, relatively few of the Chief Justices
that responded to the survey exercise direct supervisory authority over
subordinate courts, and none is empowered to intervene directly in cases
before the lower courts. Most report that their oversight function over
lower courts is limited to administrative matters such as court finances,
personnel, and procedural rules. 38 The majority also indicates that the
organization of judicial training and education programs falls within the
duties of the Chief Justice.39 Nearly half of the Chief Justices surveyed
have the power to transfer lower court judges, but most cannot do so with-
out first consulting with the affected judge and seeking the approval of an
33. See infra Appendix 5.
34. See infra Appendix 6.
35. See infra Appendix 5.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra Appendix 5, 6.
39. See infra Appendix 4.
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executive, legislative, or auxiliary judicial body.4 0
All but four of the Chief Justices surveyed report that their countries
have, or very soon will have, a published code of judicial conduct. 4 1 A
majority play a role in disciplinary proceedings for judges other than them-
selves, the exceptions being the Chief Justices of Australia, Indonesia, the
Marshall Islands, New Zealand, and Seychelles. 42 Nine of the Chief Jus-
tices surveyed-Myanmar, Cambodia, Japan, Macau, Nepal, Thailand, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Samoa, and Singapore-either preside over their
national disciplinary council or have independent power to discipline
judges who transgress their code of judicial conduct.4 3 Others organize ad
hoc disciplinary councils, refer offenders for disciplinary measures, or play
key advisory roles during judicial disciplinary procedures. Sanctions
imposed for misconduct range from salary reductions (Singapore) to trans-
fers to remote locations (Nepal) and impeachment (Japan).4 4
C. Administrative Activities
Each of the Chief Justices surveyed spends a considerable portion of
his or her time tending to administrative duties. Nineteen stated that court
administration claims at least a quarter of their time; ten placed the per-
centage at fifty percent or higher. Fiji's Chief Justice reported he spends 90
percent of his time on administrative duties.4 5 Most of the respondents
hold regular meetings to discuss ongoing administrative issues and engage
in strategic planning, but the frequency of these meetings varies signifi-
cantly. For example, while Chief Justices in Indonesia, Nepal, and the
Northern Mariana Islands hold meetings on administrative issues as fre-
quently as twice a month, Singapore's Chief Justice conducts only one or
two meetings each year.46
All but two of the countries surveyed (Cambodia and Samoa) employ a
full-time judicial administrator, and most also maintain standing commit-
tees, which oversee various aspects of judicial administration. 4 7 Keeping
abreast of these committee activities can be a major undertaking in itself-
particularly in South Korea, which maintains thirty-four separate commit-
tees under the Supreme Court.48 Some countries, including Australia, ease
this burden on the Chief Justice by distributing the responsibility for judi-
cial administration among all of its justices. Nearly all of the Chief Justices
are responsible for the preparation of an annual statistical report, which is
40. See infra Appendix 5.
41. See infra Appendix 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra Appendix 6.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Examples include the Judges Personnel Committee, Judges Appointment and
Review Committee, Judges Disciplinary Committee, Court Officials Disciplinary Com-
mittee, Civil Servants Ethics Committee of the Supreme Court, and Committee of Code
of Conduct for Judges.
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distributed to the other branches of government and the media. 49
In fiscal matters, some Chief Justices wield more authority than
others. The Chief Justice of Indonesia reports that he has "no power" over
budget appropriations for the Supreme Court or lower courts; rather the
Minister of Justice and the legislature allocate these funds.50 Chief Justices
in New Zealand and the Solomon Islands also play no role in budget mat-
ters. 51 More commonly, however, Chief Justices supervise the drafting of
the proposed budgets and submit them to the government. Chief Justices
in Nauru and the Northern Mariana Islands also negotiate with and lobby
government officials to ensure that the judiciary will receive adequate
funding to cover its budgetary projections. Once budget money enters the
judiciary's accounts, most Chief Justices play a general supervisory role in
ensuring that the funds are spent prudently.
Other administrative functions assumed by some Chief Justices in the
survey sample include case distribution and scheduling; procedural
rulemaking; judicial appointments and promotions; admission ceremonies
for new attorneys; managing the judiciary's personnel, transportation,
security, and physical facilities; enhancing technological capabilities;
supervising court registries; developing national judicial training and edu-
cation programs; 52 supervising judicial publications; handling discipli-
nary requests and media inquiries; and attending to general
correspondence. 53 Although an administrative staff typically aids Chief
Justices in performing these tasks, Chief Justices are "victim[s] of one of
the oldest rules of management: that an executive may delegate authority
but not responsibility. '5 4
D. Representing the Judiciary
In addition to their casework and judicial administrative functions,
most Chief Justices play an important symbolic and representational role
as the judiciary's chief officer. In many countries, this unique position of
visibility entails a corresponding duty to represent the judiciary at official
functions, speak out in public fora on issues affecting the judiciary,
address public grievances about the judicial system, and safeguard respect-
ful relations with other branches of government. 55 These activities foster
public confidence in the judiciary and promote judicial independence. 56
Just over half of the Chief Justices in the survey communicate with the
media either directly or through a designated communications officer. Of
49. See infra Appendix 6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Education and Training
in Asia and the Pacific, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849, 852 (2000) (discussing judicial educa-
tion and training in several of the countries surveyed).
53. See infra Appendix 7
54. Cameron, supra note 28, at 449.
55. See infra Appendix 7.
56. See David K. Malcolm, The Role and Responsibilities of a Chief Justice, Ninth Con-
ference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific 8-10 (Oct. 4, 2001).
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these, four report that they may announce policy decisions without secur-
ing prior approval from associate justices, the ministry of justice, or an
independent judicial committee.5 7 Some Chief Justices regularly make
public addresses and issue press releases on behalf of their supreme court
or the judiciary as a whole. Hong Kong's Chief Justice, for example, deliv-
ers an annual address on the state of the judiciary to media representa-
tives.5 8 Other Chief Justices do not claim to represent the judiciary and
shun contact with the public outside of the courtroom.
The survey results are also mixed with respect to Chief Justices' inter-
actions with the other political branches and the bar. Twenty of the twenty-
seven respondents indicated that they meet with the executive branch, eigh-
teen meet with the legislative branch, and twenty meet with the bar.5 9 The
Chief Justices of China and Hong Kong noted that some of these meetings
take place through intermediaries. 60 Some Chief Justices hold regular
meetings with officers of the other political branches and the bar; for
others, these meetings are few and far between.
E. Searching for Patterns
Although the survey data provide only a general overview of the duties
performed by Chief Justices in Asia and the Pacific, several features of the
data merit comment. First, the responses confirm conventional wisdom
that, by and large, Chief Justices encounter similar challenges and perform
analogous functions in their respective judiciaries. ChiefJustices from Asia
and the Pacific take office by either direct or indirect appointment and gen-
erally receive little or no significant training for their new responsibilities.
They preside over the highest court and have a special responsibility to
preserve harmonious relations among associate justices and to ensure the
timely disposition of cases. Virtually all play some role, whether formally
or informally, in overseeing judicial administration and finances, as well as
in defending the judiciary's independence. As the judiciary's titular head,
they each bear a unique responsibility to strengthen the court as an institu-
tion and to promote the rule of law.
Second, despite these common concerns and purposes, the actual
tasks performed by Chief Justices vary dramatically from country to coun-
try. Some Chief Justices exert considerable supervisory and disciplinary
authority over lower court judges; others have no role in these matters.
Some spend most of their time on court administration; others give little
attention to these issues. The frequency with which Chief Justices
announce policy decisions and interface personally with the media varies
dramatically as well. Some of these differences among countries probably
reflect the particular respondent's personality and leadership style rather
than systemic country differences. It has been my experience, for instance,
that a Chief Justice's attention to case management, judicial training, and
57. See infra Appendix 7.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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related reforms usually has less to do with that Chief Justice's formal
authority than with his or her will, resources, and imagination. In fairness,
however, many differences in the survey responses can be attributed to
legal restrictions, as the survey responses also reveal significant differentia-
tion in the functions Chief Justices are authorized to perform within their
judicial systems.
Third, perhaps the most intriguing feature of the survey data is its
resistance to generalizations. In a previous survey, I found that the size of
judiciaries manifested a strong correlation with the development of their
judicial education programs. 61 No such correlation is evident, however,
between judiciaries' size and Chief Justices' duties. For instance, many
Chief Justices of small courts spend an extraordinary amount of time on
administrative matters, while others of similar size spend little time. The
same is true of large courts and intermediate-sized courts. Likewise, the
size of a country's judiciary as a whole does not appear to have a strong
correlation with the Chief Justice's participation in disciplinary matters,
the scope of the Chief Justice's oversight authority over lower courts, or the
extent of the Chief Justice's role in public relations.
Nor do other standard classifications provide a satisfactory explana-
tion for the diverse survey data. Some general commonalities might be
perceptible within the common law and civil law traditions, but here, too,
the data are equivocal at best. For every common law Chief Justice who
purports to exercise supervisory authority over lower courts (e.g., Fiji, the
Federated States of Micronesia, New Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands),
there is another common law Chief Justice who has no supervisory author-
ity at all (e.g., Australia, the Marshall Islands, Singapore). 62 The types of
activities Chief Justices pursue and the amount of time they devote to these
activities appear to have, at most, a mild correlation to factors such as geog-
raphy; political ideology; the size, age, and composition of the highest
courts; or the size, age, and composition of the judiciaries as a whole.
Globally, the office of Chief Justice does not appear to conform to path-
dependent paradigms; rather, it takes on a distinctly sui generis aspect in
each of the countries surveyed.
III. The Promise of Judicial Education
What does the survey data tell us about the prospects for a global
education program for Chief Justices? To answer this question, we must
first define what we mean by "judicial education." In my experience, the
term "judicial education" can be disaggregated into at least three analyti-
cally distinct functions: information transmission, training, and peer
exchange. As I use these terms here, "information transmission" refers to
programs designed to enhance the Chief Justices' intellectual development
and knowledge of general legal processes (e.g., instruction on new develop-
ments in judicial administration or international law), while "training" pro-
61. Wallace, supra note 52, at 852-54.
62. See infra Appendix 5.
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grams prepare judges to perform specific tasks (e.g., budget preparation).
Both information transmission and training envision a unidirectional flow
of information from educators and trainers to participant Chief Justices.
By contrast, "peer exchange" embraces the multidirectional sharing of
ideas and experiences among Chief Justices. Peer exchange programs
aspire primarily to acquaint Chief Justices with other countries' solutions
to common problems, to foster a spirit of judicial cosmopolitanism, and to
forge relationships of trust and mutual understanding that transcend juris-
dictional divisions. Each of these functions-information transmission,
training, and peer exchange-should be analyzed to determine the best
learning methodology for Chief Justices and thus improve court systems
and promote the rule of law.
As in many other contexts, diversity poses significant challenges and
presents valuable opportunities for judicial education. Of the three educa-
tional functions I have described, judicial training programs are likely to
struggle the most. The disparate survey data indicate that it may be diffi-
cult to develop a unitary training curriculum for Chief Justices. Issues that
command the constant attention of some Chief Justices will be of little
value to others who do not participate in such matters. It would make little
sense, for example, to devote an entire conference to judicial discipline or
media relations when a sizeable portion of the attendees do not play a sig-
nificant role in these processes. Even subjects of general interest and appli-
cability, such as administration, may be difficult to address in
international training sessions because some Chief Justices command con-
siderably more authority, resources, and experience to perform administra-
tive tasks than their colleagues in other jurisdictions. In short, diversity
limits what can be accomplished through international judicial training,
and these limitations should be factored into future course planning.
Because there is no universally accepted model for the office of Chief
Justice, a homogeneous training curriculum is unlikely to meet the needs
of Chief Justices from heterogeneous traditions. Instead, the survey data
suggest that global Chief Justice programs will be most effective when two
principles are followed. First, rather than concentrate all judicial educa-
tion at the international level, global resources should be used to facilitate
local and regional efforts as well, where training curricula can be tailored
to more Chief Justices' unique needs. Second, to the extent education does
take place for Chief Justices in larger international settings, the curriculum
should either focus on general skills of universal applicability or be flexible
enough to permit Chief Justices to pick and choose training modules rele-
vant to their roles.
Judicial educators, however, need not view diversity among Chief Jus-
tices as an insurmountable obstacle to the globalization of their judicial
education. General principles of effective leadership and administration
are universal, and Chief Justices are likely to benefit from education in
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these areas despite the significant distinctions in their particular duties.63
In addition, the same philosophical and functional diversity that impedes
judicial training also provides an invaluable resource for a different, and
perhaps better, educational method: peer exchange. As I have discussed in
another article, peer exchange envisions the educator's role as a "facilitator
of learning, rather than ... an authority figure who is the repository of all
wisdom" and uses "[tihe experience of the group of learners [a]s the pri-
mary resource for ... teaching."'64 Peer exchange enables participants to
draw from a deep reservoir of experiences and perspectives, enhances par-
ticipants' control over the learning process, and gives them greater auton-
omy to draw their own conclusions from the information presented. The
distinction between training and peer exchange is particularly relevant
here: whereas diversity compromises the effectiveness of judicial training
programs, it has the opposite effect under the peer exchange model; the
more policies, practices, and perspectives represented in an assembly of
Chief Justices, the greater the potential for cross-fertilization of ideas and
resources.
Chief Justices benefit from peer exchange in a variety of ways. Newly
appointed Chief Justices and Chief Justices from fledgling sovereignties
may learn from their colleagues' cautionary experiences and build new tra-
ditions based on other countries' models rather than "reinventing the
wheel." Where the office of Chief Justice is firmly entrenched in estab-
lished traditions, peer exchange introduces new strategies for dealing with
intractable issues such as court congestion, judicial corruption, and
encroachments on judicial independence. Successful experiments in one
jurisdiction may be conducive to the cross-fertilization of practices and
procedures. Conversely, peer exchange can also help Chief Justices from
one country to recognize why certain practices might be appropriate in
other countries, but not effective in their own political or cultural context.
The value of a peer exchange methodology is further underscored by
the sui generis nature of the Chief Justice's office. Who possesses special-
ized expertise in the function and potential of the Chief Justice? The obvi-
ous answer is one who is or has been a Chief Justice. Who, then, is most
qualified to educate Chief Justices on the role of a Chief Justice? The
answer is congruent: current and former Chief Justices.
63. See Wallace, supra note 13, at 358-59 (arguing that "[tihe more one sets aside
teaching local substantive law ... and focuses more on processes, procedures, and
administrative matters, the more generic judicial education becomes").
64. Wallace, supra note 52, at 859-60 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Charles S. Claxton, Characteristics of Effective Judicial Education Programs, 76 JUDICATURE
11 (1992)); see also Christine Durham, Appellate Advocacy as Adult Education, 2 J. APp.
PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 3 (2000) ("Adults bring a lifetime of experience to every learning
situation .... Good adult education takes advantage of this resource and creates oppor-
tunities for adults to reflect on and build on their experience."); Paul M. Li, How Our
Judicial Schools Compare to the Rest of the World, 34 JUDGES'J. 17, 18-19, 47-48 (1995)
(explaining that the "peer group model" emphasizes collaboration and "learn[ing]-by-
doing").
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These principles have been the basis for the longevity of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific. Now more than two decades
old, the Conference has been remarkably successful because it relies on a
peer exchange method: each Chief Justice is a teacher and each is a stu-
dent. Ordinarily, individual Chief Justices or others are assigned to make a
brief presentation, outlining the general question of judicial administration
to be discussed. The Chief Justices respond in kind, contributing ideas
and practices derived from their own personal experience. As the discus-
sion unfolds, the participants' collective experiences become a unique res-
ervoir from which individual Chief Justices can draw lessons and models
appropriate to their individual circumstances. International dialogue at
fora like the Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific cannot
substitute for regional education programs, but it can provide a treasure
trove of information, experience, and perspectives that regional training
programs cannot duplicate. This is a resource that should be cultivated
with care.
Conclusion
Although the world's Chief Justices perform similar functions, this
comparative study of twenty-seven countries indicates that Chief Justices'
approaches to judicial administration, oversight, representation, and other
duties vary considerably-and rightfully so. Effective Chief Justices will
adapt their efforts to satisfy the unique needs of the highest court and of
the judiciary they serve. As judicial education globalizes, educators must
also keep in mind that, for Chief Justices, one size will not fit all. Chief
Justices from the various nations perform different roles and have different
needs; a monolithic training curriculum simply will not do. Instead, inter-
national and regional conferences can best assist Chief Justices by facilitat-
ing dialogue among Chief Justices-exposing each Chief Justice to new
perspectives and approaches to common problems. These comparative
perspectives on the office of Chief Justice are not merely of intellectual
interest; they are an indispensable resource for Chief Justices engaged in
promoting the effective administration of justice and the rule of law.
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY ON THE
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE HIGHEST COURT
1. Country:
2. Name of Chief Justice:
b. Number of years served as Chief Justice:
c. Number of years on highest court:
d. Name of highest court:
e. Number of judges on highest court:
e. How is the Chief Justice selected?
3. Position of Chief Justice is established by:
a. Constitution:
b. Statute:
c. Other:
4. List the document(s) where power and authority of the Chief Justice are out-
lined and attach a copy:
5. Does the authority of the Chief Justice extend to courts other than the highest
court in the nation?
a. Over trial courts?
b. Over intermediate appellate courts?
c. Describe the authority:
6. Is the Chief Justice responsible for all administration within his or her
jurisdiction?
7. In addition to administration, does the Chief Justice decide cases in the same
number as other judges of his or her court?
8. Does the Chief Justice have authority to deal with a justice of his or her court
who fails to discharge his or her work with reasonable efficiency?
a. What is the extent of that authority?
b. Does the Chief Justice have the same authority for other appellate courts?
For trial courts?
9. Does the Chief Justice determine the distribution of judicial workload for the
court?
a. If not, who does?
10. Does the Chief Justice have authority to interfere with another justice's case
decision procedure?
11. Does the Chief Justice have oversight authority over the pace of progress of a
timely disposition?
a. If so, how is it exercised?
12. If a dispute arises between the Chief Justice and another justice, how is it
resolved?
13. Did you receive training on how to perform as a Chief Justice before you
began service?
a. If so, describe the training:
b. Answer similarly for specific training since becoming Chief Justice:
14. If you as Chief Justice are responsible for administration, what percent of your
time is consumed by administration duties?
a. List the administrative responsibilities:
15. Does the Chief Justice have an administrator to assist in administration?
b. If so:
i. List his or her responsibilities:
ii. To whom does the administrator report?
iii. List experience and education of the present administrator:
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16. Does the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court use committees to which are
delegated administrative responsibility, supervision, or oversight?
a. How many committees?
b. The names of each:
17. Does the Chief Justice speak for the entire judicial institution?
a. Must he secure the approval of the court or any other body to announce
policy decisions? What body?
18. Does the Chief Justice provide an annual report with statistics?
a. To whom is it sent?
19. Is the Chief Justice responsible to communicate with the public?
20. Is the Chief Justice responsible to communicate with the media?
21. Does the Chief Justice have an interest in and a continuing obligation for the
welfare and development of judges?
22. Is there a published code of judicial conduct?
a. What role does the Chief Justice have in its enforcement?
23. What specific training would be helpful for new Chief Justices?
a. What specific training would be helpful for a sitting Chief Justice?
24. Are there rules of judicial conduct that can be enforced against a judge?
a. Are they in the Constitution, statute, or rule?
i. Please attach a copy.
b. What role does the Chief Justice play in the discipline of judges?
25. Does the Chief Justice have power to transfer judges?
a. How is this done?
26. Does the Chief Justice hold court meetings to discuss administrative matters?
How often?
27. What role does the Chief Justice play in securing an adequate budget for the
judiciary?
a. What role does the Chief Justice play in being sure the funds are properly
spent?
28. Is the Chief Justice involved in developing judicial education programs?
a. In what way?
29. Does the Chief Justice have responsibility for space and facilities for the
judiciary?
a. In what way?
30. Does the Chief Justice play a role in liaison with
a. the executive
b. the legislative
c. the bar
d. If so, in what way?
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APPENDIX 2: ADDENDUM TO SURVEY ON THE
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE HIGHEST COURT
31. Country:
32. Name of Chief Justice:
33. If you as Chief Justice have a role representing the judiciary in addition to
administrative and judging duties, what percent of your time is consumed by
the representational role?
a. List representational duties
34. Do you as Chief Justice hold regular council meetings with the head of the
subordinate courts to assist in administration?
a. If so, how many meetings per year?
